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ABSTRACT
 
Objective:
 
As a result of the over-the-counter (OTC)
introduction of loratadine, health plans have been strug-
gling to determine the best policy to incorporate this
change within their existing drug beneﬁt structure for sec-
ond-generation antihistamines (SGA). The objective of
this study was to examine the economic impact of payer
policies in response to the Rx-to-OTC switch of
loratadine.
Study Design: Decision analysis was used to model the
budgetary impact and cost-effectiveness of four policies
for SGA beneﬁts for the managed care organization
(MCO), employer, and Medicaid perspectives separately.
Patients and Methods: Outcomes included direct medi-
cal costs and lost productivity (employers only), dis-
counted, quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs) saved
because of amelioration of allergic rhinitis symptoms and
avoidance of unintentional injuries associated with the
use of ﬁrst-generation antihistamines (FGA). Bayesian
probabilistic sensitivity analysis was conducted using sec-
ond-order Monte Carlo simulation.
Results: Providing limited OTC and second-tier prescrip-
tion beneﬁts would cost approximately $0.13 and $0.30
compared to third-tier prescription beneﬁts for employers
and MCOs, respectively, and would save Medicaid $.02
per member per month (PMPM). Providing limited cov-
erage for OTC loratadine while retaining second-tier pre-
scription beneﬁts for SGA was the optimal policy for a
willingness to pay below $26,200 per QALY for all
payers.
Conclusions: Offering second-tier prescription and lim-
ited OTC beneﬁts provides greater effectiveness and is not
signiﬁcantly more expensive PMPM than discontinua-
tion. Some of the drug savings from limiting coverage of
prescription SGA may be attenuated by the cost of lost
productivity and direct medical expenditures due to unin-
tentional injuries associated with increased FGA use in
addition to the increased cost of therapeutic substitutes.
Keywords: budget impact analysis, cost and cost analysis,
histamine H1 antagonists drugs, insurance beneﬁts, Rx-
to-OTC switch.
 
Background
 
The treatment of allergic rhinitis contributes signif-
icantly to the cost of drug beneﬁts. Approximately
40 million Americans suffer from allergic rhinitis
and the prevalence is increasing every year [1,2].
Direct expenditures for the treatment of allergic rhi-
noconjunctivitis are estimated to cost approxi-
mately $5.9 billion annually in the United States [3].
When the cost of lost productivity is included (esti-
mated at $4 billion), it becomes one of the most
expensive health conditions treated in the United
States [4,5]. In 2001, antihistamines were the eighth
most expensive drug class in per member per year
expenditures and have been the third fastest grow-
ing class of medications for managed care organi-
zations (MCOs) [6]. Loratadine alone was the
fourth most expensive drug per member per year for
commercial health plans in 1999 [7]. Loratadine
became available over-the-counter (OTC) in
December 2002, and health plans have been strug-
gling to determine the best policy to incorporate this
change within their drug beneﬁt structure for sec-
ond-generation antihistamines (SGA).
A variety of policy responses exist, ranging from
complete discontinuation to covering prescription
SGA as OTCs. A majority of health plans have ini-
tiated policies to encourage use of OTC loratadine
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by raising copayments for prescription SGA, fex-
ofenadine, cetirizine, and desloratadine to the third-
tier range ($30 to $50) [8,9].
Currently, the majority (53%) of allergic rhinitis
patients are treated with ﬁrst-generation antihista-
mines (FGA), whereas 29% are treated with SGA
and 18% do nothing to treat their symptoms [10].
FGA are associated with an increased risk of unin-
tentional injuries, deaths, and reduced productivity
[4,11–19]. In health plans with very restricted drug
beneﬁts for SGA, certain price-sensitive members
may substitute with FGA [20]. In this case, shifting
the cost burden of prescription SGA to consumers
may result in increased downstream costs due to
sedation-related adverse outcomes for patients
switching to FGA.
The budgetary and economic impacts of these
deleterious consequences vary with the type of
health plan. Limiting or eliminating prescription
drug beneﬁts for SGA may result in unintended
costs to the employers who fund health plans
because of reduced employee productivity, and
unintentional injury if employees opt for less expen-
sive FGA. The Medicaid population is relatively
poorer and sicker and more sensitive to increases in
out-of-pocket spending [21]. Hence, Medicaid’s
members may be more likely to switch to FGA,
resulting in an increase in the cost of providing care
due to sedation-related adverse events.
Given the economic pressure and inclination to
restrict severely drug coverage for SGA in response
to the OTC introduction of loratadine and the
potential deleterious effects of FGA, it is important
to provide a comprehensive economic analysis of
the impact of drug beneﬁt policies to inform deci-
sion making.
 
Methods
 
Decision Model
 
Decision analysis was used to model the budgetary
impact and cost-effectiveness of four policies of pro-
viding prescription and OTC drug beneﬁts for SGA
in response to the OTC availability of loratadine
(Fig. 1). The analysis was performed separately for
three different payer perspectives: Medicaid, an
employer providing health insurance for its employ-
ees, and a commercial MCO.
The time frame of the intervention was limited to
1 year, but the present value of all lifetime costs and
effects attributed to the policy within the interven-
tion year was included in the analysis. All costs are
expressed in 2001 US dollars, using 3% as the dis-
count rate. Depending on the perspective, the
outcomes assessed included discounted direct and
indirect costs and discounted quality-adjusted life-
years (QALYs) saved because of amelioration of
allergic rhinitis symptoms and avoidance of unin-
tentional injuries.
 
Policies
 
Many of the baseline assumptions relative to the
general model have been published previously [22].
The previous model examined the cost-effectiveness
of making SGA available OTC from a societal per-
spective, whereas this analysis examines the impact
 
Figure 1
 
Decision tree of  policy options for MCO given OTC availability of  SGA (same decision tree for employer and MCO perspectives).
FGA, ﬁrst-generation antihistamines; INS, intranasal corticosteroids; MCO, managed care organization; MD, Medical Doctor; MV, motor-vehicle;
OTC, over-the-counter; PDO, property damage only; SGA, second-generation antihistamines.
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of different policy responses from the payer per-
spective. Four potential drug beneﬁt policies were
modeled based on the response of health plans to
the OTC availability of loratadine (Table 1)
[8,9,23]. Policy 1 is to provide coverage for OTC
loratadine while retaining second-tier drug beneﬁts
for other prescription SGA (OTC Second-Tier Rx).
Under this policy, managed care patients need to
obtain a physician prescription to qualify for OTC
SGA reimbursement and must pay the same second-
tier copayment as for prescription SGA. Policy 2 is
to retain second-tier drug beneﬁts for prescription
SGA but not to provide coverage for OTC lorata-
dine (Second-Tier). Policy 3 is to provide drug
coverage for prescription SGA only at the highest
third-tier copayment but offer no drug coverage for
OTC loratadine (Third-Tier). Policy 4 is to provide
no prescription or OTC drug coverage for SGA (No
Rx). All policies assume that the payer does not pro-
vide coverage for OTC or prescription FGA.
The drug beneﬁt structure and copayments used
in the model were based on estimates from the lit-
erature. Before the OTC introduction of loratadine,
at least one SGA was available through most health
plans as a second-tier (preferred brand) product
with a copayment of approximately $16 per month
supply for commercial MCOs and $1 for Medicaid
[6,24,25]. Hence, these are the copayments for pol-
icy 1 (OTC Second-Tier Rx) and 2 (Second-Tier).
After OTC availability of loratadine, many health
plans moved SGA to third-tier status. The commer-
cial MCO copayment amount used in the analysis
for policy 3 (Third-Tier) was $29, based on national
averages for third-tier or nonpreferred brands [6];
the copayment for Medicaid remained $1 for policy
3 (Third-Tier), but beneﬁts for prescription SGA
were available by prior authorization only.
 
Demand Estimates
 
Demand estimates were projected based on current
national utilization rates, market share data, and
previous research [4,6,10,22]. Projected member
responses to different policies for the Medicaid and
commercial managed care populations were based
on presumed elasticity of demand for each respec-
tive population (Table 2). Empirical evidence
suggests that when coinsurance is high (i.e., the
member pays a large portion of the cost of drugs),
the demand for prescription drugs is lower than
when coinsurance is low [26]. The demand for OTC
drugs was assumed to be slightly higher than pre-
scription drugs for similar out-of-pocket expense
based on two factors: First, empiric evidence dem-
onstrates that the improved access and ease of
purchase  provided  by  OTC  availability  result
in  a positive impact on demand independent of the
change in price [27]; and second, the opportunity
cost of obtaining prescription SGA is a deterrent.
The opportunity cost of obtaining a prescription for
SGA is approximately $55 to $75: $15 copay for
the physician visit plus 2 to 3 hours of lost time at
$20/hour. Hence, although policy 3 (Third-Tier)
 
Table 1
 
Four potential drug beneﬁt policies in response to OTC loratadine
 
Policy Description
Policy 1 (OTC Second-Tier Rx) Cover OTC loratadine and other prescription SGA at second-tier (OTC loratadine coverage requires physician
prescription)
Policy 2 (Second-Tier) Cover prescription SGA at second-tier, but not OTC loratadine
Policy 3 (Third-Tier) Cover prescription SGA at third-tier, but not OTC loratadine
Policy 4 (No Rx) No prescription or OTC coverage of  SGA
 
Table 2
 
Percentage of  allergic rhinitis patients receiving treatment by perspective and policy (projected)
 
Perspective
Policy
Medicaid baseline percentage (range)* Employer/MCO baseline percentage (range)*
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
MD visit 35 (19–53) 35 (19–53) 32 (30–34) 25 (20–29) 32 (31–33) 32 (31–33) 28 (27–29) 27 (26–28)
SGA Rx 50 (43–57) 82 (74–88) 53 (39–66) 0 50 82 58 0
INS Rx 0 0 05 (03–07) 10 (07–14) 0 0 05 (03–07) 10 (07–14)
Montelukast Rx 0 0 2.5 (02–04) 05 (03–07) 0 0 2.5 (02–04) 05 (03–07)
SGA OTC 32 (31–33) 0 3.3 (00–08) 04 (00–08) 32 (26–38) 0 10.5 (07–14) 61 (52–69)
FGA Rx 18 (09–27) 18 (12–25) 36 (22–50) 81 (79–87) 18 (16–20) 18 (12–26) 24 (10–42) 24 (17–32)
No MD visit 65 (47–81) 65 (47–81) 69 (66–70) 75 (71–80) 68 (67–69) 68 (67–69) 72 (71–73) 73 (72–74)
SGA OTC 20 (18–22) 20 (18–22) 14 (11–17) 14 (11–17) 47 (43–51) 47 (43–51) 47 (43–51) 47 (43–51)
FGA OTC 58 (50–64) 58 (50–65) 64 (63–65) 64 (63–65) 39 (35–43) 39 (35–43) 39 (35–43) 39 (35–43)
Do Nothing 22 (13–32) 22 (13–32) 22 (18–26) 22 (18–26) 14 (10–18) 14 (10–18) 14 (10–18) 14 (10–18)
 
*The 95% intervals give the credible range of  values from the 97.5th and 2.5th percentiles of  the 10,000 second-order Monte Carlo simulations.
Policy 1, OTC Second-Tier Rx; policy 2, Second-Tier; policy 3, Third-Tier; policy 4, No Rx.
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would result in a similar out-of-pocket expense for
OTC loratadine compared to prescription SGA for
the non-Medicaid population, it was expected that
the demand for OTC SGA would signiﬁcantly
increase. Demand for OTC loratadine was pro-
jected to increase for the Medicaid population
because of the encumbrance of prior authorization
and opportunity cost, but less signiﬁcantly because
of the low copayment for prescription SGA. In addi-
tion, because of the opportunity cost, it is likely that
fewer patients would visit the physician to obtain
treatment under policy 3 (Third-Tier) or 4 (No Rx)
compared to policy 1 (OTC Second-Tier Rx) or 2
(Second-Tier) for all payers.
The Medicaid population was assumed to have a
more elastic demand curve for SGA than the com-
mercial managed care population based on previous
research, demonstrating that patients with lower
income reduced their consumption of drugs by
approximately 12% for a $3 increase in out-of-
pocket spending [21]. In addition, the commercial
managed  care  population  was  assumed  to  have
a relatively less elastic demand curve based on
empiric evidence, showing that a small increase in
out-of-pocket spending does not signiﬁcantly
impact drug utilization in this population [28]. The
assumptions underpinning the shifts in demand
were varied in the sensitivity analysis to incorporate
the uncertainty surrounding projected demand
levels.
Restrictive insurance policies may encourage
patients to seek substitute therapies. In addition to
other antihistamines, the most likely substitutes are
intranasal corticosteroids (INS) and leukotrienne
receptor antagonists. We assumed that there would
be an absolute increase in the use of INS and mon-
telukast (Table 2) as a direct result of the more
restrictive policies as patients seek covered treat-
ment alternatives. Utilization of INS and montelu-
kast before the change in drug beneﬁt policy was
considered to be the baseline. Increases in the mar-
ket share of either were incorporated in the model
as absolute increases above this baseline. Hence, the
0% use of INS and montelukast for MCO under
policies 1 and 2 in Table 2 represents no change
compared to the market share before the policy
change and 5% and 10% for MCO under policies 3
and 4 represent an absolute increase of 5% and
10% above the baseline level.
 
Safety and Efﬁcacy of  Treatments
 
FGA and SGA were considered comparable in terms
of safety and efﬁcacy within their respective classes
[29–37]. The two classes, when compared against
each other, were assumed to be comparable in terms
of efﬁcacy but different in the incidence of sedation
[29,34,38–41]. Although recent estimates suggest
that the incidence of sedation is much higher [42],
the model assumed that 17% of individuals taking
FGA experienced sedation whereas SGA had no sed-
ative effect (Table 3) [33,34,36–40,43–48]. The use
of INS has been shown to have comparable or supe-
rior efﬁcacy compared to antihistamines. Neverthe-
less, it is unclear if this potential difference in
efﬁcacy equates to higher utility estimates for INS
compared to antihistamines. To date, no head-to-
head studies have assessed their differential impact
on utility. Hence the current analysis assumes a com-
parable impact on effectiveness as a result of treat-
ment with INS, antihistamines, and montelukast.
 
Table 3
 
Utilization and sedation rates and ranges used in sensitivity analysis
 
Variables Baseline value (percent) Range (percent)*
Antihistamine use, % of  year 33  25–42
Rate of  sedation, FGA 17  10–25
Rate of  sedation, SGA 0  0
Cost MD visit 167  138–196
Number of  MD visits per year 3.5 2.7–4.4
Price prescription SGA (loratidine 10 mg #120) 261  184–339
Price FGA (chlorpheniramine 12 mg #240) 33  26–41
Price INS (#4 16 g bottles of  50 
 
m
 
 ﬂuticasone) 216
Price montelukast (10 mg #120) 288
Price OTC SGA (loratidine 10 mg #120) 15  9–22
Cost of  MV injury/fatality 6172  5228–7113
Cost of  MV PDO 31  24–38
Cost of  non-MV injury 3136  2357–3926
Lost productivity cost, FGA users 522  324–717
QALY decrement, untreated AR 0.19 0.12–0.27
QALY decrement, MV injury 0.36 0.29–0.43
QALY decrement, non-MV injury 0.52 0.48–0.57
Baseline QALY 22.02 20.02–23.96
 
*The 95% intervals give the credible range of  values from the 97.5th and 2.5th percentiles of  the 10,000 second-order Monte Carlo simulations.
Abbreviations: AR, allergic rhinitis; MV, motor-vehicle; PDO, property damage only.
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Sedation-Associated Adverse Events
 
FGA use is associated with a signiﬁcant increase in
the risk of motor-vehicle accidents (2.5- to 40-fold),
a 1.5-fold increase in the risk of occupational inju-
ries and a 2.2-fold increase in the risk of all types
of unintentional injuries compared to loratadine
[11,13,49–52]. Based on this evidence, FGA use
was assumed to result in a 4-fold increase in motor-
vehicle accidents and a 1.5-fold increase in the risk
of non-motor-vehicle unintentional injuries. Rates
of unintentional injuries for the general population
were based on published estimates of injury in the
United States [2,53,54].
 
Costs
 
Cost of treatment.
 
Estimates of the amount paid
by health plans for prescription drugs were calcu-
lated by subtracting a 30% rebate for commercial
MCO and a 40% rebate for Medicaid from the
retail price [55]. The percent rebate was varied in
the sensitivity analysis. The cost of OTC loratadine
used in the model was based on the retail price of
$15.00  per  month  [56].  Allergic  rhinitis  patients
in commercial MCOs utilize antihistamines for an
average of 4 months per year [57]. The cost of a
physician ofﬁce visit for the Medicaid population
was estimated to be $26 based on estimates from
the State of California Medicaid program (Medi-
Cal) [25]; estimates of the cost of a physician ofﬁce
visit for the commercial managed care population
($167) and the number of visits per year (3.5) were
based on national averages [57]. It was assumed
that patients required an extra physician visit to
switch to INS or montelukast.
Medical expenses due to permanent injury or
death resulting from unintentional motor-vehicle,
home, or public accidents were included in the anal-
ysis, but were limited by the perspective of the payer
[58,59]. In the year 2000, approximately 4% of
motor-vehicle and 21% of non-motor-vehicle unin-
tentional injuries and fatalities were occupation-
related [54]. The medical cost of occupational
injuries was typically borne by the worker’s com-
pensation insurance provider rather than by the
health care insurer and was therefore excluded from
the analysis.
 
Lost productivity.
 
The cost of lost productivity
associated with FGA-induced sedation was only
included for the employer perspective. Lost produc-
tivity was quantiﬁed based on previous studies sug-
gesting a 25% reduction in productivity for 2 weeks
per year [4]. Using the national wage rate for indi-
viduals suffering from allergic rhinitis, the cost of
lost productivity was estimated to be approximately
$521 for each individual using FGA. We did not
include the indirect cost of lost productivity for
patients with untreated allergic rhinitis in the model
because it was assumed to be incorporated in the
utility estimates of allergic rhinitis [60].
 
Quality-Adjusted Life-years
 
Although not directly impacting the budget of
health plans, the effectiveness of any treatment
should be of signiﬁcant concern. Health plans are
willing to pay for more expensive interventions
depending on the effectiveness of the intervention
subject to the limitations of the payer’s budget con-
straint. In the current analysis, the four policy
options were treated as interventions; and effective-
ness was measured using QALYs. To determine the
discounted QALYs of untreated allergic rhinitis, the
annual decrement in utility for allergic rhinitis [61]
was subtracted from the age- and gender-adjusted
utility of the population without allergic rhinitis
[1,62]. Individuals less than 45 years of age were
assumed to have a utility score of 1 because these
utilities were unavailable in the Beaver Dam Health
Outcomes Study. Members with untreated allergic
rhinitis were assumed to have the utility of the 25th
percentile of individuals suffering from allergic
rhinitis whereas those treated with SGA, FGA, INS,
or  montelukast  were  assumed  to  have  the  utility
of the 75th percentile [61]. Similarly, discounted
QALYs for unintentional injuries resulting in per-
manent injury or death were calculated by subtract-
ing the decrement caused by permanent disabling
injury from the utility of individuals of similar age
and gender for each year of remaining life [22].
 
Sensitivity analyses.
 
In the absence of empiric data
for each of the four policy options, the current
model is based on several assumptions and esti-
mates. To examine how these assumptions impact
the results of the analysis, a Bayesian probabilistic
sensitivity analysis was conducted using a second-
order Monte Carlo simulation. This method
attempts to make transparent how the uncertainty
in the assumptions underlying the model impacts
the results by allowing all of the input parameter
values to vary simultaneously over their possible
ranges. The reported ranges for costs and effects can
be interpreted as including the 95% credible range
of  values  similar  to  conﬁdence  intervals  based
on the input parameter probability distributions
[63,64]. Speciﬁc probability distributions were cho-
sen to reﬂect reasonable values for probabilities,
incidence rates and odds ratios, costs associated
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with health care use, unintentional injuries and lost
productivity, market share and utilization rates,
utility, and QALYs [63,65]. Probabilities, incidence
rates, utilities, and market share were assumed to
follow a beta distribution because they are normally
distributed but restricted to take on values between
0 and 1. Mean cost was assumed to follow one of
two distributions: a gamma distribution, reﬂecting
the long right tail and restriction to positive values
or when large enough to ensure positive values, a
normal distribution.
 
Results
 
Budget Impact
 
The expected per member per month (PMPM) cost
of each policy is listed in Table 4. The more gener-
ous beneﬁts are only slightly more expensive than
restricted or no-beneﬁt-for-all health plans. The
reported results are the PMPM cost of all-allergic-
rhinitis-related costs by policy. To put these costs
into perspective, the PMPM cost of antihistamines
alone for the average health plan was $1.70 in 2001
[6].
 
Cost-Effectiveness
 
For all three payers, providing second-tier insurance
beneﬁts for OTC and prescription SGA (policy 1:
OTC Second-Tier Rx) was a dominant policy (cost
less and provided greater or equal effectiveness)
compared to retaining prescription beneﬁts but not
providing OTC beneﬁts (policy 2: Second-Tier—
Table 4). In addition, policy 3 (Third-Tier) was
eliminated through extended dominance [66]. The
elimination of policies 2 and 3 through dominance
and extended dominance makes policies 1 and 4 the
only viable remaining options for all payers under
the base case results.
The remaining alternatives for each perspective
must be judged by their respective incremental cost-
effectiveness ratios subject to the payer’s budget
constraint. For example, policies 1 and 4 are the
only remaining options after eliminating dominated
strategies. If an employer is willing to pay $16,468
or less for an intervention providing one additional
QALY, policy 1 is the optimal remaining strategy.
Likewise, if Medicaid is willing to pay $3946 or less
for an intervention providing one additional QALY,
policy 1 is the optimal remaining strategy (and
$26,226 for MCO). It should be noted that only
policy 3 versus 4 for the employer and MCO per-
spectives exceeds $50,000 per QALY.
 
Sensitivity Analysis
 
The base case results are dependent on a series of
assumptions and parameter values. Bayesian prob-
abilistic sensitivity analysis allows the input param-
eters of the model to vary across their feasible
ranges and computes the corresponding range of
results. These results for the 10,000 Monte Carlo
simulations are presented in Tables 2 to 4 as the
95% range of values for market share assumptions,
PMPM cost, expected cost, and QALYs of each pol-
icy and perspective.
The likelihood that any policy is cost-effective
depends on the willingness to pay of the respective
payer. The results of the multivariate probabilistic
sensitivity analysis can be used to determine this
 
Table 4
 
Expected per member per month (PMPM) cost and cost-effectiveness results by policy and payer perspective
 
Variable Medicaid (range)* Employer (range)* MCO (range)*
Expected PMPM cost policy 1 4.86 (4.09–5.68) 8.45 (7.19–9.74) 6.45 (5.43–7.57)
Expected PMPM cost policy 2 4.99 (4.19–5.85) 8.59 (7.31–9.93) 6.60 (5.56–7.75)
Expected PMPM cost policy 3 4.88 (4.08–5.69) 8.32 (7.04–9.68) 6.15 (5.19–7.18)
Expected PMPM cost policy 4 4.60 (3.83–5.41) 8.17 (6.92–9.47) 6.01 (5.08–7.02)
Expected cost policy 1 411 (346–480) 714 (608–823) 545 (459–640)
Expected cost policy 2 422 (354–494) 726 (618–839) 558 (470–655)
Expected cost policy 3 412 (345–481) 703 (595–818) 520 (439–607)
Expected cost policy 4 389 (324–457) 690 (585–800) 508 (429–593)
Expected QALY policy 1 21.930 (19.94–23.90) 21.957 (19.95–23.89) 21.952 (20.03–23.92)
Expected QALY policy 2 21.930 (19.94–23.90) 21.957 (19.95–23.89) 21.952 (20.03–23.92)
Expected QALY policy 3 21.928 (19.94–23.90) 21.9562 (19.95–23.89) 21.9505 (20.03–23.92)
Expected QALY policy 4 21.924 (19.94–23.90) 21.9559 (19.95–23.89) 21.9502 (20.03–23.92)
ICER policy 1 vs. 2 ($/QALY) Dominant Dominant Dominant
ICER policy 1 vs. 3 ($/QALY) Dominant 8,850 21,086
ICER policy 1 vs. 4 ($/QALY) 3,946 16,468 26,226
ICER policy 2 vs. 3 ($/QALY) 7,633 21,957 34,299
ICER policy 2 vs. 4 ($/QALY) 6,219 27,757 37,853
ICER policy 3 vs. 4 ($/QALY) 6,183 55,342 52,449
 
*The 95% intervals give the credible range of  values from the 97.5th and 2.5th percentiles of  the 10,000 second-order Monte Carlo simulations.
Policy 1, OTC Second-Tier Rx; policy 2, Second-Tier; policy 3, Third-Tier; policy 4, No Rx.
Abbreviation: ICER, incremental cost-effectiveness ratio.
 Sullivan and Nichol
 
408
 
likelihood over the range of possible willingness-to-
pay values for each pairwise comparison of policies.
Policy 1 (OTC Second-Tier Rx) is cost-effective
compared to policy 4 (No Rx) in 95% of all simu-
lations for an employer who is willing to pay
$21,000 or less to gain one QALY. Hence, while the
base case analysis suggests that an employer could
gain one QALY for $16,468 by selecting policy 1
instead of policy 4, the sensitivity analysis results
show that the employer can be 95% conﬁdent that
this would cost less than $21,000 per QALY. The
corresponding willingness to pay for MCO and
Medicaid is $47,500 and $19,500, respectively.
Comparing each policy head-to-head as above
for each payer would result in 18 different compar-
isons and make interpretation unwieldy. It is pos-
sible, however, to simultaneously illustrate the
likelihood that each policy is cost-effective com-
pared to all other policies using the net beneﬁt
framework [65]. This is conceptually similar to
simultaneously comparing all pairwise cost-
effectiveness acceptability curves. For each of the
10,000 Monte Carlo simulations, the average net
beneﬁts of the four policies were calculated for a
given willingness-to-pay value [67]. The average net
beneﬁt for any given policy = expected QALYs -
expected cost/willingness to pay. Hence the most
cost-effective policy for a given willingness to pay
would be the policy with the highest net beneﬁt. In
contrast, the average cost-effectiveness ratio for any
given policy = expected cost/expected QALYs. The
average cost-effectiveness ratio has no meaningful
interpretation without information about the quad-
rant of the cost-effectiveness plane to which the cost
and effectiveness pair corresponds. Furthermore,
the average cost-effectiveness ratio cannot be com-
pared between policies to determine the most cost-
effective policy. There is one policy with the greatest
average net beneﬁt for each of the Monte Carlo sim-
ulation results and a given willingness-to-pay value.
The proportion of times a particular policy has the
greatest net beneﬁt among the 10,000 simulations
can be interpreted as the probability that the given
policy is cost-effective for each value of the willing-
ness to pay.
The likelihood that each policy is cost-effective is
graphed as a function of the willingness to pay for
the employer perspective in Fig. 2. For any given
willingness to pay, the proportion of the 10,000
Monte Carlo simulations that result in the greatest
net beneﬁt is equivalent to the probability that the
policy is cost-effective on the y-axis. This is why the
percent cost-effective for all policies for any given
willingness to pay must add up to 1. It is clear from
Fig. 2 that No Rx is the most likely to be cost-
effective for an employer willing to pay less than
$17,000 per QALY whereas OTC Second-Tier Rx is
the most likely to be cost-effective for an employer
willing to pay more than $17,000. Similarly, Sec-
ond-Tier is more likely to be cost-effective than No
Rx and Third-Tier Rx for willingness to pay more
than $31,000 per QALY. For the Medicaid perspec-
tive, No Rx is most likely to be cost-effective for a
willingness to pay less than $4000 whereas OTC
Second-Tier Rx is most likely to be cost-effective for
a willingness to pay more than $4000 (and $26,000
for MCO).
 
Univariate Sensitivity Analysis
 
Although second-order probabilistic sensitivity
analysis provides a thorough assessment of the
impact of uncertainty in the input assumptions on
the results of the model, univariate sensitivity anal-
ysis elucidates the impact of speciﬁc variables and
provides additional insight into the structure of the
model. Because conducting univariate sensitivity
analyses for all variables and assumptions is unten-
able, this analysis has focused on some of the more
important input variables such as the odds of
motor-vehicle and non-motor-vehicle accident, the
cost of lost productivity for employers only, QALY
estimates, and changes in demand. The model
results do not vary signiﬁcantly if the odds of
motor-vehicle accidents, while sedated, range from
1.0 (no effect) to 8.0 for the MCO perspective (the
base case is 4.0): the incremental cost-effectiveness
ratio of policy 1 versus policy 4 ranges from
$27,360 per QALY (odds 1.0) to 24,671 (odds 8.0).
The results are similar for the odds of non-motor-
vehicle accident: odds of 1.0 have very little impact
on the results, whereas odds of 8.0 make policy 1
 
Figure 2
 
Cost-effectiveness acceptability curves for all policy
options: employer perspective. Of  the four policy options, No Rx is
most likely to be cost-effective for a willingness to pay below $17,000
per QALY while OTC Second-Tier Rx is most likely to be cost-effec-
tive above $17,000.
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signiﬁcantly more cost-effective (the base case is
1.5). Varying the decrement in QALYs due to aller-
gic rhinitis does not signiﬁcantly impact the results
unless there is no QALY decrement (a 100% reduc-
tion from the base case), in which case policy 1 is no
longer cost-effective compared to policy 4. Never-
theless, assuming that there is no QALY decrement
for motor-vehicle injuries or fatalities has no impact
on the model results. From the employer perspec-
tive, policy 1 would remain cost-effective compared
to policy 4 if the cost of lost productivity was
assumed to be $0 ($26,217 per QALY). If the per-
cent of patients who visit the physician under policy
4 is increased to 32% (27% is the base case), policy
1 becomes less cost-effective compared to policy 4
($46,867 per QALY). In contrast, varying the per-
cent of patients who switched to INS or montelu-
kast due to policy 4 had no impact on the model
results.
 
Comments
 
Decision analysis was used to model the impact of
four policy responses to the Rx-to-OTC switch of
loratadine for three different payer perspectives. In
addition to the direct medical costs and effective-
ness of treatment with antihistamines, the impact
of unintentional injuries and lost productivity was
included within the conﬁnes of the different
perspectives.
Based on the assumptions in the model, the
results suggest that providing second-tier prescrip-
tion and limited OTC beneﬁts for all SGA is not sig-
niﬁcantly more expensive PMPM and in some cases
less expensive than limiting SGA beneﬁts to third-
tier status. To obtain improved effectiveness for
members, policy 1 (OTC Second-Tier Rx) would
cost approximately $0.13 and $0.30 PMPM com-
pared to policy 3 (Third-Tier) for employers and
MCOs, respectively, and would actually save Med-
icaid $0.02. Although the PMPM cost of antihista-
mines for health plans was approximately $1.70 in
2001 (before OTC loratadine), discontinuing cov-
erage altogether does not afford this level of sav-
ings. Some of the drug savings from discontinuing
coverage of SGA may be attenuated by the cost of
direct medical expenditures and lost productivity
associated with the increased use of FGA and result-
ant unintentional injuries in addition to an unantic-
ipated increase in the cost of substitute therapies.
The differential impact of INS, montelukast, and
antihistamines on effectiveness was assumed to be
approximately comparable. Some studies have sug-
gested that INS offer superior efﬁcacy compared to
antihistamines,  but  how  this  potential  difference
in efﬁcacy correlates to improvements in utility is
unclear. It is unlikely that the marginal improve-
ment in effectiveness would offset the higher cost of
prescription INS. (In particular because the univar-
iate sensitivity analysis showed no impact on the
model results from signiﬁcant changes in the QALY
associated with allergic rhinitis and the market
share  of  INS  and  montelukast).  Future  studies
are needed to address the differential impact of
treatment with INS versus antihistamines on the
utility of allergic rhinitis patients for use in cost-
effectiveness analyses.
The intangible cost of administrative time spent
by the health plan was not included. For example,
the cost of patient telephone inquiries about beneﬁt
changes and the administration of prior authoriza-
tion were not included. The impact of including
these costs would likely make the more restrictive
policies (policies 3 and 4) cost more and hence
appear less cost-effective compared to policies 1 and
2.
It is important to note that the limited focus of
the payer perspective ignores the enormous societal
cost of FGA-induced sedation and includes only
those costs directly born by the individual payers. In
addition, budget impact analysis ignores the impact
of policies on the effectiveness of treatment. A for-
mal cost-effectiveness analysis is a more compre-
hensive measure of the impact of the different
policies and provides estimates of how much a given
payer would need to pay for speciﬁc improvements
in effectiveness. For a willingness to pay less than
$26,200 per QALY, providing limited coverage for
OTC SGA while retaining second-tier prescription
beneﬁts for SGA was the best policy option for all
payers. Although the majority of health plans seem
poised to implement policy option 2 or 3, based on
the assumptions in this model the results suggest
that these two policy options are not optimal.
Results from the sensitivity analysis demonstrate
that policies 2 and 3 are the least likely to be cost-
effective for all payers. Policy 4, however, is less
costly but also less effective. If employers are willing
to pay $17,000 or less for an additional QALY
($4,000 and $26,000 for Medicaid and MCO,
respectively), policy 1 is the most likely to be cost-
effective compared to policy 4. However, if payers
are not willing to pay for improved effectiveness in
treating allergic rhinitis, policy 4 is the least expen-
sive option.
The SGA have been one of the most expensive
drug classes for health plans and OTC availability
of loratadine has been viewed as a convenient
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opportunity to reduce this cost burden. The results
of this analysis show that although there are some
savings afforded by shifting the cost burden to the
consumer, these savings are largely eroded when a
comprehensive analysis includes changes in market
share for prescription and OTC treatments for
allergic rhinitis, the cost of lost productivity (for
employers), and medical costs associated with unin-
tentional injuries. In addition, providing limited
OTC coverage while retaining generous second-tier
prescription coverage for SGA is the optimal policy
compared to limiting or discontinuing prescription
beneﬁts: it improves treatment effectiveness at very
minimal cost.
Decision analysis is well suited for studies where
the analysts are projecting potential impact in the
absence of actual data; however, this is also a limi-
tation of the methodology. The model simpliﬁed the
complexities of the real world to provide an esti-
mate of the potential impact of beneﬁt policies. The
projected demand estimates used in the model are
obviously not deﬁnitive because there are no data
available to document demand shift. Although an
attempt to incorporate this uncertainty in the sen-
sitivity analysis has been made, the results of this
analysis are dependent on the assumptions under-
pinning the model. Nevertheless, decision makers
must choose between different policy options in the
absence of certainty regarding potential changes in
demand. This study provides preliminary informa-
tion about the impact of common policy reactions
to OTC loratadine to shed light on the possible con-
sequences of such policies. When available, actual
estimates of the demand for antihistamines and
therapeutic substitutes, both OTC and prescription,
should be incorporated to determine more precisely
the impact of different policies for different payers.
 
This research was conducted without external funding.
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